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OPINION 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
Alton Coles was the leader of a Philadelphia drug 
distribution ring responsible for selling a staggering amount 
of both cocaine and cocaine base (also known as crack) from 
1998 to 2005.  The defendant in this appeal, Asya 
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Richardson, was Coles‘ fiancée.  In the summer of 2005, the 
couple used drug money to purchase a new home.  Not long 
after, a federal grand jury returned a series of indictments 
charging Coles and others with various drug trafficking and 
firearms offenses.  Eventually the grand jury returned a fourth 
superseding indictment charging Richardson with money 
laundering.  The government‘s theory was that, in the course 
of purchasing the new home, Richardson had participated in 
financial transactions knowing that they were designed to 
conceal the criminal origin of the money involved.  The case 
proceeded to trial, and at the close of the government‘s case, 
Richardson moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the 
evidence was insufficient to support a guilty verdict.  The 
court denied the motion and Richardson was convicted.  
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the evidence is 
insufficient to sustain Richardson‘s conviction.  We will 
therefore vacate the conviction and remand for entry of a 
judgment of acquittal.   
I. Facts 
 In addition to being a drug dealer, Coles was the CEO 
and owner of Take Down Records, a recording label that 
produced rap and hip-hop music.  He also threw weekly 
parties at Palmer‘s, a nightclub located in downtown 
Philadelphia.  Coles‘ drug activity generated substantial 
revenues, but his legitimate businesses were not profitable.  
Take Down Records operated at a loss, and the nightclub 
parties broke even (though they produced substantial cash 
receipts in the form of cover charges).  
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 In the summer of 2002, Coles and Richardson met and 
began dating.  The relationship blossomed into a serious 
romance, and by December 2002, the two were engaged.  But 
within a year of the engagement, the couple was involved in a 
domestic dispute causing Richardson to flee their apartment.  
She went to court seeking a restraining order, and in support 
of her application, submitted an affidavit in which she averred 
(among other things) that Coles ―is a big time drug hustler.‖1  
Despite their difficulties, Coles and Richardson eventually 
reconciled.   
                                                 
1
 Richardson says we cannot consider the ―drug hustler‖ affidavit 
in reviewing the denial of her motion for judgment of acquittal.  
She asserts that the affidavit was not admitted until after the 
government rested, and that considering it thus would violate the 
rule that a decision on an acquittal motion made at the close of the 
government‘s case must be made based on the evidence then 
existing.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.  Richardson is incorrect.  Before 
Coles‘ and Richardson‘s joint trial, the government indicated its 
intent to introduce the affidavit in its case against Richardson.  But 
it pointed out that if she did not testify (and thus was not available 
for cross examination), introducing the affidavit could violate 
Coles‘ confrontation rights.  See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 
123 (1968).  To avoid the confrontation problem, the District Court 
bifurcated the money-laundering counts, explaining that the jury 
would decide Coles‘ case before hearing about the affidavit and 
determining Richardson‘s guilt or innocence.  So when the 
government announced that it was resting, its case against 
Richardson remained open for the purpose of introducing the 
affidavit.   
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 In February 2005, Coles and Richardson decided to 
purchase a home together.  They picked out a new house 
located in Mullica Hill, New Jersey.  The purchase price for 
the home was $466,190.  Coles and Richardson signed a 
purchase contract with the homebuilder, and Coles issued two 
checks from his personal checking account at Citizens 
Bank—one for $10,000 and another for $30,000—as a 
deposit towards the home‘s purchase price.   
 Coles and Richardson applied for a joint mortgage 
through the homebuilder‘s lender affiliate, NVR Mortgage 
Company.  In the application, Coles claimed to earn $100,000 
per year as the CEO of Take Down Records, and Richardson 
truthfully stated that she made $22,800 annually as a 
customer service representative at Bank of America.  The 
mortgage application was rejected because Coles had poor 
credit.   
 NVR referred the couple to Pine Creek Mortgage 
Services, a ―last resort‖ mortgage company.  Pine Creek 
reviewed Coles‘ credit history and concluded that it would 
not be able to secure a joint mortgage for the couple.  It 
determined, however, that Richardson had good credit and 
that it could probably obtain an individual mortgage in her 
name.  At Pine Creek‘s suggestion, the couple removed 
Coles‘ name from the home purchase contract and 
Richardson completed an application for a ―stated income‖ 
mortgage.
2
  The application vastly overstated Richardson‘s 
                                                 
2
 ―Stated income‖ means the lender verifies the applicant‘s 
employment but not her income.  The income listed on the loan 
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income.  It indicated that she had three jobs and that she 
earned over $110,000 per year.  Pine Creek nevertheless 
approved the application, and settlement on the house was 
scheduled for July 29, 2005.   
 Besides the $40,000 already paid to the homebuilder, 
the couple planned to put an additional $74,000 down on the 
home at settlement.  In the days leading up to the settlement, 
Coles made a number of cash deposits into Take Down 
Records‘ business account at Citizens Bank.  He later 
transferred the funds to his personal checking account to use 
towards the down payment.   
 The day of settlement was marked by a flurry of 
banking activity.  At 12:08 p.m., a $9,800 cash deposit was 
made into Coles‘ and Richardson‘s joint checking account at 
PNC Bank.  This deposit took place at a PNC branch located 
in Philadelphia.  At 1:12 p.m., Coles made a $9,140 cash 
deposit into Take Down Records‘ business account.  The 
funds were later transferred to Coles‘ personal checking 
account and used towards the down payment.  Half an hour 
later, at the same bank branch, Coles deposited $9,200 in cash 
directly into his personal checking account.  At 3:33 p.m., 
Richardson made a $9,200 cash deposit into the couple‘s joint 
checking account.  This deposit was made at a PNC branch 
located in Stratford, New Jersey, which was near the location 
                                                                                                             
application is accepted as accurate unless the underwriters 





  Finally, at 4:00 p.m., Coles made a $6,160 
cash deposit into a Wachovia checking account belonging to 
his son.  This deposit, too, occurred at a branch located in 
Stratford.   
 The couple proceeded to the settlement, where Coles 
tendered three checks to cover the $74,000 outstanding on the 
$114,000 down payment.  The first was an official check for 
$49,000 purchased with money from Coles‘ personal 
checking account at Citizens Bank.  The second was a 
$19,000 cashier‘s check purchased with money from the 
couple‘s joint checking account at PNC Bank.  The third was 
an official check for $6,000 bought with money from Coles‘ 
son‘s checking account at Wachovia.  The settlement went 
smoothly.  Because Coles had been dropped from the home 
purchase contract and mortgage, the property was titled in 
Richardson‘s name only.      
II. Procedural History 
 On August 3, 2005, shortly after the couple had moved 
into the new home, a federal grand jury returned an 
indictment charging Coles with a single count of possession 
of a firearm by a convicted felon.  Three superseding 
indictments followed charging Coles and others with various 
                                                 
3
 We know Richardson made this deposit herself because the 
deposit slip evidenced her handwriting.  It is not clear whether 
Richardson or Coles made the earlier PNC deposit.  The bank 
could not locate the deposit slip and no other evidence pointed in 
either direction.     
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drug trafficking and firearms crimes.  On March 22, 2006, a 
fourth superseding indictment was filed charging Coles and 
Richardson with money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(a)(1)(B)(i), conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 
U.S.C. § 1956(h), and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343.  Coles 
and Richardson proceeded to trial along with four other 
defendants.  At the close of the government‘s evidence, 
Richardson moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that 
the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.  The 
District Court took the matter under advisement, after which 
Richardson presented evidence in her own defense.  The jury 
found Coles and Richardson guilty on the money-laundering 
charges but acquitted them of wire fraud.  The jury also 
convicted Coles of drug trafficking.  After the trial, the 
District Court issued a ruling denying Richardson‘s motion 
for judgment of acquittal.  The Court sentenced Richardson to 
24 months in prison.  This appeal followed.    
III. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
―We exercise plenary review over a district court‘s grant or 
denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the 
sufficiency of the evidence.‖  United States v. Starnes, 583 
F.3d 196, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  Because Richardson moved for 
judgment of acquittal at the close of the government‘s case-
in-chief, and because the District Court reserved ruling on the 
motion, we must confine ourselves to the evidence that 
existed at the time the motion was made.  See Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 29(b); United States v. Tyson, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 
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3314942 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Moore, 504 F.3d 
1345, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that Rule 29 entitles the 
defendant ―to a snapshot of the evidence at the point that the 
court reserves its ruling‖).  We can uphold Richardson‘s 
convictions only if the government‘s evidence would permit a 
reasonable jury to ―find the essential elements of the crime[s] 
beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  Starnes, 583 F.3d at 206.  In 
determining whether this standard is met, we view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, 
mindful that it is the jury‘s province (and not ours) to make 
credibility determinations and to assign weight to the 
evidence.  United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 480 (3d Cir. 
2010).           
IV. Analysis 
 We begin with the provision of the money-laundering 
statute under which Richardson was convicted.  It provides:  
Whoever, knowing that the property involved in 
a financial transaction represents the proceeds 
of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or 
attempts to conduct such a financial transaction 
which in fact involves the proceeds of specified 
unlawful activity . . . knowing that the 
transaction is designed in whole or in part . . . to 
conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the 
source, the ownership, or the control of the 
proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . . shall 
be sentenced to a fine . . . or imprisonment for 




18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).  Thus the government had the 
burden of establishing four elements: ―(1) an actual or 
attempted financial transaction; (2) involving the proceeds of 
[a] specified unlawful activity; (3) knowledge that the 
transaction involves the proceeds of some unlawful activity; 
and (4) . . . knowledge that the transaction[ was] designed in 
whole or in part to conceal the nature, location, source, 
ownership, or control of the proceeds of [a] specified 
unlawful activity.‖  United States v. Omoruyi, 260 F.3d 291, 
294–95 (3d Cir. 2001).  Richardson‘s sufficiency challenge 
focuses on the second and fourth elements.   
Richardson attacks the District Court‘s conclusion that 
the financial transactions culminating in the purchase of the 
home involved the ―proceeds of [a] specified unlawful 
activity.‖  Omoruyi, 260 F.3d at 294.  She does not dispute 
that drug trafficking is a ―specified unlawful activity.‖  It 
clearly is.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A).  Nor does she 
dispute that the transactions involved at least some drug 
money.  The government demonstrated that Coles‘ legitimate 
businesses (Take Down Records and the nightclub parties) 
were unprofitable, thereby permitting the jury to infer that at 
least some of the money used on the $114,000 down payment 
came from Coles‘ other source of income: drug trafficking.  
See United States v. Stewart, 256 F.3d 231, 249 (4th Cir. 
2001) (―‗Evidence that a defendant was engaged in drug 
trafficking and had insufficient legitimate income to produce 
the money used in a transaction is sufficient to establish that 
the money was derived from . . . drug distribution.‘‖) (quoting 
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United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1483 (10th Cir. 
1996)). 
 Richardson contends, however, that the government 
failed to prove that the transactions involved the ―proceeds‖ 
of drug distribution.  The evidence, Richardson notes, 
established only that the transactions involved gross receipts 
of drug distribution, and not that they involved profits of drug 
distribution.  Citing the Supreme Court‘s decision in United 
States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008), Richardson argues that 
the term ―proceeds,‖ as used in the money-laundering statute, 
means profits, not gross receipts.  For its part, the government 
acknowledges that it failed to prove that the transactions 
involved profits of drug distribution.  But it disagrees with 
Richardson‘s reading of Santos, arguing that the statute‘s use 
of the term ―proceeds‖ means gross receipts, at least in drug 
trafficking cases.  
 Efrain Santos operated an illegal lottery for over two 
decades.  He used the gross receipts of the lottery to pay the 
winners and his employees (the runners and collectors who 
made the scheme possible).  Id. at 509.  Based on these 
payments, Santos was convicted under a provision of the 
money-laundering statute that makes it unlawful to use 
criminal ―proceeds‖ to promote illegal activity.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).  Concluding that the statute‘s use 
of the term ―proceeds‖ means profits, the lower courts 
invalidated Santos‘ conviction because the evidence showed 
only that the predicate payments involved gross receipts of 
the illegal lottery.  Santos v. United States, 461 F.3d 886, 894 
(7th Cir. 2006), aff’g 342 F. Supp. 2d 781 (N.D. Ind. 2004).     
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A splintered Supreme Court affirmed.  A four-justice 
plurality noted that the term ―proceeds‖ is ambiguous: 
dictionary definitions indicate that it can mean either profits 
or gross receipts.  553 U.S. at 511.  Invoking the rule of lenity 
(under which ambiguity in a criminal statute must be 
construed in the defendant‘s favor), the plurality opined that 
the term ―proceeds,‖ as used in the money-laundering statute, 
means profits, not gross receipts.   Id. at 514–15.  The 
plurality also observed that adopting a receipts definition of 
―proceeds‖ would create a ―merger problem‖ in certain types 
of cases:  
If ―proceeds‖ meant ―receipts,‖ nearly every 
violation of the illegal-lottery statute would also 
be a violation of the money-laundering statute, 
because paying a winning bettor is a transaction 
involving receipts that the defendant intends to 
promote the carrying on of the lottery. Since 
few lotteries, if any, will not pay their winners, 
the statute criminalizing illegal lotteries . . . 
would ―merge‖ with the money-laundering 
statute. Congress evidently decided that lottery 
operators ordinarily deserve up to 5 years of 
imprisonment, [18 U.S.C.] § 1955(a), but as a 
result of merger they would face an additional 
20 years, § 1956(a)(1). [Indeed, t]he merger 
problem is not limited to lottery operators. 
[A]ny specified unlawful activity, an episode of 
which includes transactions which are not 
elements of the offense and in which a 
participant passes receipts on to someone else, 
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would merge with money laundering. . . . The 
Government suggests no explanation for why 
Congress would have wanted a transaction that 
is a normal part of a crime it had duly 
considered and appropriately punished 
elsewhere in the Criminal Code to radically 
increase the sentence for that crime. Interpreting 
―proceeds‖ to mean ―profits‖ eliminates the 
merger problem. [A] criminal who enters into a 
transaction paying the expenses of his illegal 
activity cannot possibly violate the money-
laundering statute, because by definition profits 
consist of what remains after expenses are paid.  
Id. at 515–17.   
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment.  He 
eschewed the plurality‘s conclusion that ―proceeds‖ should 
always be construed to mean profits.  Id. at 525 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in judgment) (―[T]his court need not pick a single 
definition of ‗proceeds‘ applicable to every unlawful activity, 
no matter how incongruous some applications may be.‖).  He 
began by observing that ―the legislative history of [the 
money-laundering statute] makes it clear that Congress 
intended the term ‗proceeds‘ to include gross revenues from 
the sale of contraband and the operation of organized crime 
syndicates involving such sales.‖  Id. at 525–26 & n.3.  At the 
same time the legislative ―history sheds no light on how to 
identify the proceeds of many other types of specified 
unlawful activities,‖ including operating an illegal lottery.  Id.  
Given the absence of helpful legislative history, Justice 
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Stevens was persuaded to concur in the judgment because 
applying a receipts definition in Santos‘ case would have run 
headlong into the merger problem that the plurality had 
identified.  Congress could not have intended ―such a 
perverse result.‖  Id. at 526–28 & n.7.       
Writing for the four dissenting justices, Justice Alito 
argued that ―the term ‗proceeds‘ in the money laundering 
statute means gross receipts, not net income.‖  Id. at 546 
(Alito, J., dissenting).  Although the dissent disagreed with 
Justice Stevens‘ approach ―insofar as it holds that the 
meaning of the term ‗proceeds‘ varies depending on the 
nature of the illegal activity that produces the laundered 
funds,‖ it expressly agreed with him that a receipts definition 
was appropriate in cases arising from ―‗the sale of contraband 
and the operation of organized crime syndicates involving 
such sales.‘‖  Id. at 531–32.  Finally, the dissent disagreed 
that the merger problem called for a profits definition in some 
or all money-laundering cases: ―[T]he so-called merger 
problem is fundamentally a sentencing problem, and the 
proper remedy is a sentencing remedy.‖  Id. at 547.4   
                                                 
4
 Congress legislatively overruled Santos in 2009.  Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 
2(f)(1), 123 Stat. 1617, 1618 (2009).  As amended the money-
laundering statute defines ―proceeds‖ as ―any property derived 
from or obtained or retained, directly or indirectly, through some 
form of unlawful activity, including the gross receipts of such 
activity.‖  Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9)) (emphasis 
added).  The government acknowledges that the 2009 amendment 
does not apply retroactively to this case.       
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 We believe that ―proceeds‖ means gross receipts in the 
circumstances of this case.  For starters, the merger problem 
that impelled a majority of the Supreme Court to throw out 
Santos‘ conviction is not present here.  Purchasing real 
property is neither integral to nor an expense associated with 
the crime of drug trafficking.  Moreover, five justices agreed 
in Santos that ―proceeds‖ means gross receipts in cases 
involving the sale of drugs and other contraband.  Although 
not binding (because four of the justices who expressed this 
view did not concur in the Court‘s judgment, see Marks v. 
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)), the collective view 
of five justices is, of course, persuasive authority.  See 
Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 298–300, 304 
(1996); Swisher Int’l, Inc. v. Schafer, 550 F.3d 1046, 1057 n.8 
(11th Cir. 2008).  Finally, our sister circuits uniformly agree 
that ―proceeds‖ means receipts in the drug trafficking 
context—at least where (as here) there is no merger problem.  
See Wilson v. Roy, 643 F.3d 433, 437 n.3 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(collecting cases); United States v. Quinones, 635 F.3d 590, 
599 (2d Cir. 2011).  Cf. United States v. Yusuf, 536 F.3d 178, 
189–90 (3d Cir. 2008) (upholding money-laundering 
conviction where transactions clearly involved profits, thus 
eliminating need to address profits-versus-receipts issue).  
 Richardson next argues that even if she knew drug 
money was used to purchase the home, there was not 
sufficient evidence to meet the fourth element of money 
laundering, i.e., that she participated in financial transactions 
knowing that they were designed (at least in part) to conceal 
the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the 
money.  Omoruyi, 260 F.3d at 294–94.  ―In this context, 
 16 
 
‗design‘ means purpose or plan, i.e., the intended aim of the‖ 
transactions.  Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550, 563 
(2008).  The government need not prove that the defendant 
herself had the intent to conceal one of the listed attributes of 
the funds.  It is enough to prove that the defendant knew 
someone else had that purpose.  United States v. Carr, 25 
F.3d 1194, 1206 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Campbell, 
977 F.2d 854, 857–58 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 Evidence of a purpose to conceal can come in many 
forms, including ―statements by a defendant probative of 
intent to conceal; unusual secrecy surrounding the 
transaction; structuring the transaction in a way to avoid 
attention; depositing illegal profits in the bank account of a 
legitimate business; highly irregular features of the 
transaction; using third parties to conceal the real owner; a 
series of unusual financial moves cumulating in the 
transaction; or expert testimony on practices of criminals.‖  
United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1475–76 
(10th Cir. 1994) (citing cases, including United States v. 
Massac, 867 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 1989)).        
The government argues that Richardson had 
knowledge of a design to conceal based on (1) the fact that 
Coles made cash deposits into Take Down Records‘ business 
account only to then transfer the money to his individual 
checking account for personal use; (2) the irregular nature of 
the depositing activity that occurred on the day of settlement; 
and (3) the facts that Richardson lied about her income on the 
mortgage application and that the house was titled in 
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Richardson‘s name even though Coles was the ―de facto‖ 
owner.   
 We agree with the government that funneling cash 
through an ostensibly legitimate business—a classic example 
of money laundering—is ordinarily sufficient to prove a 
design to conceal the nature and source of the money.  United 
States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 842 (7th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Rivera-Rodriguez, 318 F.3d 268, 277 (1st Cir. 2003).  
But it was Coles, not Richardson, who funneled cash through 
the Take Down Records account.  The government adduced 
no evidence suggesting that Richardson participated in or 
knew about the transactions involving the account.  This 
evidence thus cannot be used to establish knowledge of a 
design to conceal on Richardson‘s part.   
The government is surely correct that the depositing 
activity that occurred on settlement day was highly suspect.  
As a money-laundering expert explained at trial, banks are 
required to file a currency transaction report when they accept 
a cash deposit of $10,000 or more.  The report is sent to the 
IRS, which compares it against the depositor‘s tax return to 
check for discrepancies.  The five deposits made on 
settlement day took place at four different bank locations, and 
each involved under $10,000 in cash—four just barely so.  
This is powerful evidence that the deposits were structured to 
deflect government attention, and thus to conceal the nature, 
source, and ownership of the funds.  See United States v. 
Tekle, 329 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003); Rivera-
Rodriguez, 318 F.3d at 272; Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d at 1478 
(design to conceal shown where asset purchase was funded by 
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bank deposits that had been structured to sidestep currency 
reporting requirements).     
The problem the government faces, however, is that 
there is precious little evidence connecting Richardson to the 
pattern of suspicious depositing activity.  True, the 
government established that Richardson made the $9,200 
deposit at the PNC branch located in Stratford.  But it offered 
no evidence from which to infer that Richardson participated 
in or was aware of the other deposits that occurred on 
settlement day.  A single cash deposit of less than $10,000 is 
not sufficient to establish knowledge of a design to conceal as 
to the transaction as a whole.   
 Yet we must still consider the evidence that 
Richardson lied about her income on the mortgage 
application and allowed the house to be titled in her name 
even though Coles was the true owner.  This evidence, 
according to the government, proves that Richardson intended 
to hide Coles‘ role as the source of the purchase money.  The 
circumstances of this case indicate otherwise.   
The following facts are undisputed.  After deciding to 
purchase the home in Mullica Hill, Coles and Richardson 
both signed the home purchase contract, and Coles wrote two 
checks from his personal bank account to cover an initial 
$40,000 deposit.  The couple submitted an application for a 
joint mortgage, in which Coles claimed to make $100,000 per 
year as the CEO of Take Down Records and Richardson 
stated truthfully that she earned $22,800 annually as a Bank 
of America employee.  The application was rejected, 
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however, because of Coles‘ negative credit history.  
(Importantly, had the application been approved, the house 
would have been jointly titled in Coles‘ and Richardson‘s 
names.)  They were then referred to a mortgage company of 
―last resort,‖ which examined Coles‘ credit history and 
concluded that it would not be able to secure a joint mortgage 
for the couple.  The company determined, however, that 
Richardson had good credit and that it could obtain an 
individual mortgage for her.  It thus advised the couple to 
delete Coles‘ name from the home purchase contract and to 
apply for a mortgage in Richardson‘s name only.  Richardson 
went along with the plan and (knowing that she could not 
qualify for a mortgage based on her true salary) submitted a 
mortgage application that vastly overstated her income.  The 
mortgage was approved, and the house was titled in 
Richardson‘s name because she was the sole mortgagor.   
These circumstances show that Richardson lied about 
her income and had the property titled in her name, not to 
hide Coles‘ involvement (which by then was perfectly 
obvious), but to get around Coles‘ bad credit and purchase the 
house as planned.  Cf. United States v. Conley, 37 F.3d 970, 
979 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466, 
1471–73 (10th Cir. 1991).  No jury could have reasonably 
reached a different conclusion.   
Viewed as a whole, the evidence was not sufficient to 
establish knowledge of a design to conceal on Richardson‘s 
part.  For this reason, we must vacate not only Richardson‘s 
money-laundering conviction but also her conviction for 
conspiracy to commit money laundering.  After all, without 
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knowledge of a design to conceal the nature, source, or 
ownership of the money, Richardson could not have agreed 
to conceal the nature, source, or ownership of the money.  See 
United States v. Henry, 325 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2003).  The 
government has not argued otherwise.     
V. Conclusion 
 For these reasons we will vacate the District Court‘s 
judgment and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal.   
